Argentiniens Weg in die
größte Pleite des Kapitalismus.
(Argentinien-Berichte des Economist seit
Juni 2001 - mit deutscher
Zusammenfassung am Schluss)
Economist, 9. Juni
2001:
“Unless the economy rapidly returns to
growth, a huge bond swap will have merely postponed a dept
default… This involved exchanging some USD 29.5 billion in mainly
short-term dept for newly issued bonds which expire after 2005. The
urgent thing was that, before the swap, Argentina had looked unable to
refinance the heavy burden of dept due to expire in the next five years
and would, perhaps sooner rather than later, have defaulted… After
three years of recession, and with unemployment at 15%, depressed
Argentines are desperate for a recovery. The swap aims to foster this by
deferring some USD 7.7 billion in dept payments due before the end of next
year… In recent months, Argentina’s borrowing bill has surged, as
investors have demanded ever-higher premiums to compensate for the risk of
default. … But Argentina’s reprieve has come at a high price. It will
pay interest of about 15% on the new bonds, compared with an average of
9-12% on those traded in. The swap will be a success only if the economy
returns swiftly to growth of at least 5% a year, and the government
generates a fiscal surplus, thus reassuring investors that Argentina can
service its postponed - and now augmented - debts in future. … The
prospects, however, do not look good. … Last December President
Fernando de la Rua’s government hoped that it had created the conditions
for recovery by negotiating a USD 40 billion bundle of loans and credit
guarantees, led by the IMF. But as the slump continued, in March investors
and Mr. de la Rua both panicked. … Unless there is growth soon,
Argentina’s expensively acquired breathing-space may not last
long.”
Economist, 23. Juni 2001: ”Introduced in 1991,
Argentina’s currency-board system, under which the local peso is tied to
the dollar at bar, has been seen as the lifebelt that has kept the economy
afloat. … And the lifebelt has seemed more like a millstone.” “The
obvious solution, a devaluation, is a non-starter. Less than a tenth of
the government’s dept is denominated in pesos, so devaluation would bring
financial ruin to it as well as to private-sector borrowers. A big
refinancing early this month of USD 29 billion-worth of commercial dept,
through a swap for longer-dated bonds, bought a respite. But the shadow of
a potentially catastrophic default still hangs over Argentina. So on
June 15th Domingo Cavallo, the economy minister … announced a package of
reforms, including a system of subsidies for exports and tariffs for
imports, which will have the effect of introducing a floating exchange
rate for foreign trade. … Concern that this was a first step towards
full-scale devaluation sent the price of Argentina's bonds tumbling.
… Mr. Cavallo has announced plans to pump as much as USD 5 Billion into
the economy, by issuing bonds secured against overdue tax receipts. … It
is a risky strategy…” ”Despite the recent dept swap, the spectre of
default will soon loom once more if the economy does not
grow.”
Economist, 14. Juli 2001: ”Argentina's
intensifying problems are causing difficulties for its neighbours,
spreading pessimism across the region. “On July 10th … investors
demanded interest rates of 14% in an auction of three-month treasury
bills, up from 9% last month, and showed no appetite for longer-dated
bonds. Domingo Cavallo, the economy minister, admitted that Argentina
could not go on paying such high interest rates, or its situation would
‘worsen geometrically’. Only last month he thought he had won a breathing
space by swapping short-term bonds worth USD 29.5 billion for longer-term
ones. … Investors have dumped emerging-market shares, bonds and
currencies in a flight to safer assets.”
Grafik: Staatsschulden
als Prozent des BSP.
Economist, 21. Juli 2001: ”…on July
14th, when Mr. Cavallo escorted his daughter to her sumptuous wedding,
they were pelted with eggs by angry demonstrators. That summed up the
surly mood with which Argentina greeted Mr. Cavallo’s lastditch effort to
stave off a debt default and devaluation… “We will spend only what we
collect in revenues and we will fight tax evasion to eliminate the deficit
and our dependence on expensive loans,” said a tired-looking Mr. Cavallo,
after admitting that Argentina “had no more credit”. At first, the
public reacted by queuing up to take their money out of the banks,
prompting shortages of dollars. Bankers reported a brisk demand for
safe-deposit boxes; Argentines have seen enough economic crisis to know
that dollar accounts can be forcibly converted to devalued pesos by
governments.” ”Mr. Cavallo wants to trim total government spending by
USD 1.5 billion this year and USD 4.3 billion next. … Mr. Cavallo will cut
central-government salaries and pensions by 13% for the next three months;
… These cuts face fierce opposition: trade unions staged strikes this
week.” Argentina has two underlying problems. One is the rigidity of
its exchange-rate peg, and the strength of the dollar. …The other problem
is a state bloated by pork-barrel spending and hampered by a creaky tax
system. Rather than tackle this, for ten years governments borrowed. Now
time has run out. The choices are austerity or bust.”
Economist,
4. August 2001: “This week the country’s Senate approved Mr. de la
Rua’s austerity plan, and the government bought back short-term debt
coming due this year. Even so, recent falls in bank deposits and tax
revenues have spooked investors, who worry that Argentina is heading for a
debt default. Overnight interest rates soared to 35%, and Argentine
securities plunged.”
Economist, 11. August 2001: “Since
it came together, George Bush’s team has had a confused approach towards
emerging-market crisis. In principle, the administration is sceptical of
bailing out economies in trouble. … After all, it did not decry a USD
40 billion rescue programme for Argentina organised by the International
Monetary Fund last December, and it strongly backed an IMF bail-out of
Turkey this spring. With Argentina's deepening crisis, though, the Bush
team has been sending conflicting signals. … Taken together, the message
seemed clear: no more bail-outs, and certainly no money from America. Las
week the message appeared to shift. … Horst Köhler, the IMF’s head, was
effusive about Brazil’s ‘strong track record’ and praised its efforts to
deal with ‘a difficult external environment’ - for which, read Argentina.
… Wall Street took these two announcements to mean one thing: that the
IMF had largely given up on Argentina and was now trying its best to
protect Brazil from contagion. … Only days later, however, the mood
changed yet again.”
Economist, 18. August 2001: “After a
week of tough negotiations in Washington, Argentina's economic team seemed
close to persuading the IMF that they deserved more support. … It
appeared that agreement had been reached on a new IMF loan worth around
USD 8 billion, in addition to bringing forward USD 1.2 billion under a
previous loan agreement. … But it was still far from clear whether the
new money would in fact alleviate Argentina's agony. It might simply
prolong it. …” “The IMF loans may just about tide the government over
until the election.” “Bank deposits and international reserves have
fallen sharply.”
Grafik: Argentiniens
Bankguthaben
“Argentina faces large dept repayments to the Fund
in 2002 and 2003. The new loan would increase the load, making repayment
hard unless the economy is growing fast. … This week, protesters threw
up barricades on 33 roads across the country. Last week around 25,000
demonstrators in Buenos Aires called for an end to the cuts and cheered
speakers who advocated a default.”
Economist, 25. August
2001: “The sharp slowdown in America has already caused a
recession, maybe not at home, but in Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan and
elsewhere. In more and more countries around the world output is now
stalling, if not falling. Total world output probably fell in the second
quarter for the first time in two decades. … The current global
slowdown differs from others in the past half-century in three ways that
may determine its outcome. The most striking is that economic weakness is
more widespread than in previous downturns. … So far this downturn is not
deep, but it could be the most synchronised since the 1930s. Therein
lies the biggest risk. Economies have become increasingly integrated
through trade and investment in recent years, to their great benefit. But
the downside to this globalisation is that the economic slowdown around
the world is now proving self-reinforcing, magnifying the initial fall in
demand. As investment has collapsed in America and Japan, those
countries have slashed their imports from East Asian producers. But weaker
demand in Asian countries is causing them in turn to trim their imports,
not just from America and Japan, but also from Europe. The chances of a
prolonged American (and global) downturn have thereby increased
considerably. … It is an investment-led downturn. America’s long
expansion in the 1990s encouraged rosy expectations about future growth
and profits, encouraging over-investment financed by heavy borrowing. … No
investment bubble has ever burst without causing a serious economic
downturn.” “Paul O’Neill, America’s folksy treasury secretary,
explained why the talks between Argentina and the IMF over a new loan
dragged on into a second week. …The loan is needed because of fears that
Argentina might be pushed to default on its debt or devalue its currency.
… So will the new loan achieve its goals? Certainly, it should buy
Argentina's government some time: USD 5 billion of the new money can be
used straightaway. … While a large-scale debt restructuring is
necessary, it will be complicated. The details remain sketchy. But the
money involved looks to be too little to help Argentina to meet some USD
17 billion in debt-service payments due next year… It is true that the
currency board makes a devaluation especially difficult and costly (around
70% of bank deposits and private-sector debt is in foreign
currency).”
Economist, 25. August 2001: ”A week later
than advertised, Argentina's government got the help it had been seeking
from the IMF, in the form of the promise of a new USD 8 billion loan.
Added to USD 14 billion still left over from a previous agreement struck
last December, officials hope that this money will restore confidence in
their country’s economy and in their ability to service the USD 127
billion public dept.”
Economist, 22. September 2001: ”In
July … Argentina discovered it had exhausted investors’ confidence and
thus its access to credit…. Interest payments on debt (are) down by USD
2.7 billion on this year. … Since interest payments now account for a
fifth of total federal spending ….”
Grafik:
argentin_zinszahlung “But even if it succeeds, it will merely
postpone, not end, the risk of a debt default - unless and until the
economy starts growing again.”
Economist, 13. Oktober
2001: “After external credit had dried up, the government in July
declared that it would at once eliminate its fiscal deficit. But the
ensuing spending cuts have further slowed activity, hitting tax revenues,
which slumped 14% last month. Since there seems to be little alternative
other than full-scale disaster…”
Economist, 20. Oktober
2001: ”Nearly half the electorate did not vote for any candidate in
the congressional elections of October 14th…. 19% of the electorate cast
blanc or spoilt ballots, or, though voting is required by law, simply
stayed at home. … Argentina has USD 128 billion of public foreign
debt….” Recession and deflation have bitten hard: private-sector wages
have fallen some 20% in the past three years, and overt unemployment now
stands at about 17%.”
Economist, 3. November 2001: “The …
question is what went wrong in Argentina, for so long seen as a model
reformer. …. “Many say they have had no jobs for years. In (Buenos
Aires) what was long the richest city in Latin America, ‘each year,
there’s more and more hunger and less and less hope’ … Income per head
in Argentina was similar to that of France, Germany and Canada in the
1930… An economic recession is now well into its fourth year. … Open
unemployment stands at over 16%; another 15% are ‘underemployed’. Wages in
manufacturing have fallen by up to a fifth (in nominal terms) in three
years… ’Privatised services and foreign bank branches have been
fantastically profitable. The Argentina that has to compete with the world
has done very badly’… A run on the banks saw USD 8 billion leave in
July and August. … Neither has the government persuaded local banks and
pension funds (in all, locals hold perhaps half of the USD 132 billion
public dept) to accept bonds paying less interest and with a three-year
grace period in a ‘voluntary’ dept swap. … The government’s immediate
problem is that its faces interest payments of USD 1.4 billion this month.
…”
Economist, 17. November 2001: “Any dept swap with
foreign creditors would require guarantees from outsiders, such as the IMF
or the United States Treasury. But Mr de la Rua received only polite
praise form American officials. … Others believe the delay has come too
late to salvage Argentina's creditability. … But the government has let
Buenos Aires province play wages in bonds called Patacones; Mr. Cavallo
intends to pay the government’s arrears to the provinces (totalling USD
850 m) with similar funny money. …
Economist, 8. Dezember
2001: ”Argentines are hardly neophytes when it comes to living
through economic crises. So, after government last weekend imposed
exchange controls and restrictions on cash withdrawals from bank accounts,
the reaction was one of resignation and quiet anger rather than disorder.
.. The controls mean that Argentines can withdraw only USD 1,000 per
month in cash from their bank accounts. All other payments must be made be
cheque, credit or debit cards…. The government decided to act when it
saw the outflow of money that has reduced bank deposits by around a fifth
since January turn into a full-scale run….” “At present, only one
Argentine in four has a bank account.” … “The controls have prevented
the collapse of the financial system … in a dogged effort … to avoid the
inevitable: default on the country’s USD 135 billion public
dept…” Last, and most important, it became apparent that Mr Cavallo
could not longer count an the support of the IMF, which has helped
Argentina with loan arrangements amounting to USD 48 billion in the past
year. … On December 5th, the Fund said that it was ‘unable at this
stage to recommend completion’ of its review of Argentina's loan
programme. Translation: it will not release the last tranche of its latest
loan, worth USD 1.3 billion, unless the government either adopts the
dollar, or devalues. Without the IMF money, the government would have
to dig further into its reserves. Even so, it could meet its obligations
only until ‘the middle of the first quarter’, according to a report by
Credit Suisse First Boston, an investment bank. …” Local banks and
pension funds have agreed to swap some USD 50 billion of bonds for more
generous loans, saving the government USD 4.5 billion in interest payments
next year. … Recession has turned to slump. Since July, the economy has
shrunk at an annual rate of around 10% … The provinces and the national
government have resorted to printing exchangeable bonds - funny money.
… A debt default is inevitable and will be legally
messy.”
Economist, 15. Dezember 2001: “Most Washington
officials privately reckon that he (Mr. Cavallo) will also have to extract
much bigger debt write-downs from bondholders than the current
restructuring plans envisage.”
Economist, 22. Dezember
2001: ”A one-day general strike on December 13th attracted more
support than had seven previous stoppages during Mr de la Rua’s term.
After 42 months of recession, the patience of some Argentines has snapped.
… The latest official survey says that in October unemployment exceeded
18% (it is now probably 20%). … Meanwhile, the government is scrambling
to meet debt payments by hook or by crook: to do so this month, it delayed
the payment of state pensions and forced private pension funds to hand
over bank deposits for government paper. … Most investors already view
outright dept default as inevitable.”
Economist, 5. Januar
2001: “Argentina's foreign creditors, back from holiday, are
bracing themselves for a long wrangle for their money, amid uncertainty
about whom they will wrangle with. The moratorium on the country’s USD
155 billion of public foreign-currency dept, declared on December 23rd by
President Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, who promptly resigned, had least cleared
up doubts about how bad things could get. Yet financiers, so far, have
been surprisingly sanguine about the biggest default in history - one,
they say, which had looked inevitable for about a year. … The Argentine
bondholders committee, a group formed in November to put some big
investors’ views to the Argentine government, had difficulty this week
finding officials in Buenos Aires to talk to. … The mere announcement
of a moratorium means that any bondholder can now ‘accelerate’ his claim,
demanding from the debtor immediate und full payment of principal and
interest. Still, acceleration in this case is not likely to lead to prompt
payment. … Most creditors calculate that they will preserve most value
by negotiation. Veterans of sovereign workouts recognise that negotiations
will take at least two years, and that it may bi six month before they
even start…. The IMF’s refusal to bail out Russia in 1998, and
Argentina too, for now, are exceptions rather than a refreshing new trend.
By contrast, strategic factors have governed rich-country aid for Turkey
and Pakistan. Both countries are seen as important allies in the battle
against global terrorism. Argentina may not have the strategic importance,
in America eyes, to qualify for a further bail-out.” “’Argentina is
bust. It’s bankrupt. Business is halted, the chain of payments is broken…
and we don’t have a peso to pay Christmas bonuses, wages or pensions.’
Thus Eduardo Duhalde, in his speech to Congress after it had chosen him as
Argentina's president on January 1st. … Looting and mass demonstrations
drove Fernando de la Rua from the presidency on December 20th, after just
two years of a government that hat frittered away all of its initially
considerable political support. … The government has not had access to
international credit (except from the IMF) since July. It had already
repatriated nearly all of its liquid foreign assets to avoid their seizure
by creditors. … The bank controls have enraged the middle class.
… Some 14 million Argentines, or more than two in five, now live in
poverty ….The country’s proud middle class, unusually large for a Latin
American country, is shrinking fast. Meanwhile, cuts in welfare spending
mean that in the past two years the numbers without enough income to cover
basic food needs have doubled to 5.5 million…. So discredited are
politicians that in October’s congressional elections more than 25% of the
electorate failed to carry out their legal duty to vote. Of those who did,
21% cast blank or spoiled ballots. … Since 1958, only three of
Argentina's 18 presidents have completed their allotted
terms.”
Economist, 12. Januar 2002: ”In the street, the
peso was trading as low as 1.60 to the dollar. Having originally said that
the foreign-exchange market could reopen on January 9th, the government
later postponed this by two days while it worked on the new regulations.
Mr Duhalde’s measures dump much of the pain from devaluation on to the
banks. Most mortgages and loans were taken out in dollars, while wages are
mainly in pesos. So a devaluation makes most Argentines bankrupt as their
government. … In fact, though some prices have already gone up, the
economy’s deep recession may restrain inflation. … But measures leave
the banks - most of the big ones are foreign-owned - staring at huge
losses. To compensate, they will receive the proceeds from a new tax of up
to 20% on oil and gas exports (the main exporter, Repsol, is Spanish). …
As well as having many of their loans but not their deposits devalued, the
banks will lose in other ways. … The bankers claim they will lose more
than $10 billion from turning loans into pesos, or more than half their
total capital of $17 billion. … Mr Remes has talked of seeking a fresh
IMF loan of $15 billion-20 billion…. Sensibly, Mr Duhalde has rejected
Mr Rodriguez’s scheme to print a third currency. … Miguel Angel Broda,
an independent economist, says that, at best, the new government’s
measures may halt the economy’s “implosion”; he reckons that it contracted
at an annual rate of 15% in the last quarter of 2001. But, he says,
recovery is a very distant prospect.” … “Much of the cost of the
devaluation will be borne by (mostly foreign-owned) banks and privatised
utilities (whose charges, hitherto in dollars and indexed to American
inflation, will rightly be switched to pesos). … The grim truth for
Argentina is that things will get worse before they get better. Having
defaulted on its $155 billion debt, the government faces messy talks with
creditors. But a coherent economic plan could start to restore confidence,
and tempt back the $20 billion or so that fled the country last
year. Since Argentina was once seen as a successful model for
free-market policies in Latin America, the scale of its troubles has
inevitably brought calls (some form Mr Duhalde himself) for the country,
and the region, to turn their backs on such policies. In two respects, the
reward from openness has indeed been disappointing. Capital flows have
proved fickle, especially in recent years. And rich-world protectionism,
especially for farm products, has robbed Latin America of some of the
benefits of open trade.”
Economist, 19. Januar
2002: ”After a decade of parity, in the free market the peso
quickly plunged, to around 1.85 to the dollar. … Mr Duhalde’s
measures have put much of the burden on the banks and privatised
utilities, several of which are Spanish-owned. … The IMF, too, is
trying to sound conciliatory. It has agreed to postpone for a year
repayment of $933m owed to Argentina, … Argentina could start to
recover by the end of this year, an IMF official said this
week.”
Economist, 26. Januar 2002: ”But rightly or
wrongly, many Argentines blame their country’s economic collapse at least
in part on free-market policies which they see as championed by America.
… The crux, of the problem is that two-thirds of bank deposits are in
dollars, as are most loans. To the fury or the bankers, Mr Duhalde
promised that dollar deposits would eventually be honoured in dollars,
while ordering that bank loans of less than $100,000 be converted into
(devalued) pesos. The government estimates the cost of this mismatch at $5
billion; … Mr Duhalde’s measures were aimed at cushioning the impact of
devaluation on the hard-pressed public, who have already suffered
recession since 1998. But as Carlos Escude, a foreign-policy specialist,
says, the measures have aroused “an invincible coalition o opponents”,
including European governments as wall as the IMF and the banks,
…”
Economist, 09. Februar 2002: ”Mr Duhalde’s team has
now moved closer towards adopting the “coherent” plan urged upon them by
the IMF and sundry outsiders, including the Bush administration. … Many
details have still to be worked out. … Even so, the plan has some obvious
flaws. If inflation is not to take off, freeing the currency needs to be
combined with tight monetary and fiscal policies. On paper, the government
is committed to these. The Central Bank will print no more than 3.5
billion pesos this year. The budget maintains a 13% cut in public sector
wages and pensions imposed last year, increases spending only an emergency
help for the poor, … And in the face of political pressures, the
government may find that the easiest way of sticking to its budgets is to
let inflation reduce the value of spending. … Mr Duhalde has broken his
original, rash, promise to repay dollar savings in dollars while turning
dollar loans into pesos. … In all, reckons Pedro Lacoste, an economic
consultant, propping up the financial system may require the government to
issue new debt of $20 billion. … The immediate test for Mr Reme’s
plan is how far and fast the peso depreciates. … Because of the
corralito, Argentines have little cash to buy dollars. The Central
Bank still has $14 billion of reserves. …, and unemployment may have reached
25%.”
Economist, 16. Februar 2002: ”The peso has not
crashed - yet … Despite predictions of an immediate collapse, by
mid-week the peso stood fairly firm, at around 1.90 to the dollar - though
that is 47% less than it was worth before Argentina’s fixed exchange rate
collapsed last month. But demand for dollars is artificially
restricted. Bank savings are still frozen, …. Banks are not selling
dollars, … With these restrictions, and reserves of $14 billion, the
government can choose the exchange rate it likes. The test will come when
it loosens the controls. By then, it hopes to have backing form the
IMF.”
Zusammenfassung: Argentinien hatte in den
30er Jahren einen Lebensstandard wie Deutschland oder Frankreich. Buenos
Aires war bis vor wenigen Jahren die reichste Stadt in
Lateinamerika. Heute leben über 14 Millionen oder zwei Fünftel der
Argentinier in Armut. 5,5 Millionen Argentinier haben nicht genug zu
essen.
1991 Argentinien bindet den Kurs des Peso an den
US-Dollar. (Und bekommt so mehr ausländische Direktinvestitionen und
billigere Kredite auf dem internationalen Geldmarkt, weil Rückzahlung bzw.
Gewinntransfer in Dollars versprochen wird.)
1997 Wirtschaftswachstum von rund
8%. 1998 Das Wirtschaftswachstum geht auf 4 % zurück.
1999 Negatives Wachstum: - 3,5%. 2000 Die
ausländischen Gläubiger befürchten eine baldige Zahlungsunfähigkeit
Argentiniens (Economist, 2.12.2000). Der IWF sichert die privaten Kredite
ab und gewährt Argentinien neue Kredite und Kreditgarantien über 40 Mrd.
USD. 2001.01. Ein drittes Jahr mit Wirtschaftskrise beginnt
(Im Jahresschnitt knapp liegt das Wirtschaftswachstum unter 0 %). Die
offizielle Arbeitslosigkeit liegt bei 15%. Weitere 15 % sind mit
Gelegenheitsjobs „unterbeschäftigt“. 2001.03. Das
Wirtschaftswachstum für 2001 wird auf minus 3 % geschätzt (es liegt dann
bei minus 10 %). Gläubiger und Argentinische Regierung „packt Panik“
(‚Economist'). 2001.06. Die Amerikanische Regierung weigert
sich, sich innerhalb des IWF an einer finanziellen Rettung Argentiniens zu
beteiligen. (Das wird vom ‚Economist' erst im August berichtet:
„certainly no money from America“. Die Hauptlast der Argentinischen Pleite
trifft ja das europäische Kapital (Spanien), nicht das US-Kapital. Ebenso
wie bei Argentinien hatten sich die USA auch 1998 bei Russland geweigert,
helfend einzuspringen. Auch hier traf die Hauptlast das europäische
Kapital. wb) Die Argentinische Regierung vereinbart eine
Schuldenumverteilung mit den ausländischen Gläubigern: über 7,7 Milliarden
USD Schulden, die vor Ende des nächsten Jahres fällig werden, sollen - gegen höhere Zinsen - bis
2005 verlängert werden. Neue Argentinische Bonds im Wert von 29,5 Mrd. USD
werden angeboten. Die Gläubiger verlangen eine Verzinsung von 15 % statt
wie im Vormonat 9 % und akzeptieren nur dreimonatige
Laufzeiten. 2001.07. Die Gesamtschulden Argentiniens betragen
127 Mrd. USD. Der Schuldendienst der Zentralregierung verschlingt 20 %
ihrer Ausgaben. Der Argentinische Wirtschaftsminister gibt zu:
„Argentinien hat keinen ausländischen Kredit mehr“ (‚Economist') und wird
von Demonstranten mit faulen Eiern beworfen. Es beginnt ein Ansturm auf
die Banken. Privatkonten werden abgeholt und der Bedarf an
Bankschließfächern steigt rapide. Die Regierung verspricht den
Gläubigern Ausgabenkürzungen von 1,5 Mrd USD in diesem Jahr und 4,3 Mrd.
im nächsten Jahr. U.a. sollen Beamtengehälter und Beamtenpensionen um 13 %
gekürzt werden. 2001.08. Eine Abwertung des Pesos gegenüber
dem Dollar würde die Schuldenlast erhöhen, weil rund 70 % aller
Bankguthaben und der privaten Kredite über US-Dollars laufen. Die
Übernacht-Zinsrate steigt auf 35%. Der IWF schießt noch einmal 8 Mrd. USD
an Krediten bzw. Kreditgarantien nach. (Wohl um die argentinische
Regierung über die Parlamentswahlen im Dezember zu helfen. wb) Die
Steuereinnahmen gehen um 14 % zurück. Demonstranten errichten
Straßensperren im ganzen Land. Im Juli und August werden 8 Mrd. USD von
privaten Bankguthaben abgehoben. 2001.09. In den letzten drei
Jahren sind die Nominallöhne in der Privatwirtschaft um 20 % gefallen.
Offizielle Arbeitslosigkeit: 17%. 2001.10. Aus Protest gegen
ihre Politikerklasse geben zu den Parlamentswahlen am 20. Oktober 21 % der
Wähler ungültige Wahlzettel ab, 25 % der Wähler erscheinen nicht zur Wahl,
obwohl die Stimmabgabe gesetzlich vorgeschrieben
ist. 2001.11. Die Zentral- und Provinzregierungen zahlen ihre
Gehälter in „Ersatzgeld“. 2001.12. Geschätztes
Wirtschaftswachstum für 2001: minus 8%. Schuldenstand: 135 Mrd.
USD. Die Regierung blockiert den freien Zugang zu privaten Bankkonten.
Jeder darf nur noch 1000 USD im Monat abheben. Zahlungen sollen unbar
erfolgen, aber nur jeder vierte Argentinier hat ein Bankkonto. Die
Regierung beraubt die Lokalbanken und die Rentenkassen um 50 Mrd. USD,
indem sie ihnen praktisch wertlose Bonds aufzwingt. Selbst wenn alle
Maßnahmen greifen, kann Argentiniens Regierung ihre Schulden nur noch bis
„Mitte Februar 2002“ bedienen. Das Wirtschaftswachstum des Jahres 2001
sank um rund 10%. Die offizielle Arbeitslosenrate liegt bei 20%.
Gewerkschaften rufen zum Generalstreik auf. Präsident Rua tritt
zurück. Rund 20 Mrd. USD wurden im Laufe des Jahres 2001 aus
Argentinien abgezogen. 2002.01 Argentiniens Schuldenstand:
155 Mrd. USD. Der neue Präsident Duhalde erklärt am 1. Januar:
„Argentinien ist pleite!“. Die Bindung des Pesos an den Dollar wird für
Kredite unter 100.000 USD aufgehoben. 2002.02 Die Regierung
kündigt an, dass sie zusätzliche Pesos drucken wird, um durch Inflation
ihre Schulden auf die Verbraucher abzuwälzen. Die Argentinische
Zentralbank verfügt noch über 14 Mrd. USD. Die offizielle
Arbeitslosigkeit erreicht rund 25%. Wal Buchenberg,
24.2.2002 |